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Abstract 
 
 In this paper, we document the continuing decline in employment and labor force 
participation of black men between the ages of 16 and 34 who have a high school 
education or less. We explore the extent to which these trends can be accounted for in 
recent years by two fairly new developments: (1) The dramatic growth in the number of 
young black men who have been incarcerated; and (2) Strengthened enforcement of child 
support policies. We use micro-level data from the Current Population Survey Outgoing 
Rotation Groups (CPS-ORG), along with state-level data over time on incarceration rates 
and child support enforcement, to test these hypotheses. Our results indicate that post-
incarceration effects and child support policies both contribute to the decline in 
employment activity among young black less-educated men in the past two decades, 
especially among those age 25–34.  
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I. Introduction 
During the 1990s, employment rates among young and less-educated minority women—
particularly African-Americans—increased quite dramatically. This increase is generally 
attributed to a combination of welfare reform policies, expansions of the Earned Income 
Tax Credit (EITC) and other supports for working poor families, as well as a very robust 
labor market during that time period (Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001; Blank 2003).  
In contrast, the employment rates of young less-educated black men continued 
their long secular decline during this time period. Though young less-educated black men 
did benefit from the economic boom of the 1990s, and the wages of those in the labor 
force seemed to rise in this period, the boom was not sufficient to offset the negative 
secular trend that has been reducing employment and labor force activity among these 
young men for the past several decades Furthermore, there has been little good evidence 
to date about why this trend has continued in the 1990s, despite positive trends in 
educational attainment and reductions in criminal activity for this group.1
In this paper, we explore the effects on the labor force activity of young less-
educated black men from two relatively recent developments: (1) The dramatic rise in the 
share of young black men who have been incarcerated during the past two decades; and 
(2) Growing enforcement of child support orders in that time period. Both these factors 
disproportionately affect young black men; and both are likely to limit the employment 
                                                          
1 See Freeman and Rodgers (2000) and Holzer and Offner (2002) for a discussion of these trends for men 
ages 16–24. Both these articles provide evidence that the boom did raise employment rates among young 
black men, but the latter clearly indicates that the increases were not great enough to offset the group’s 
long-term secular decline in employment. In that paper, much of that secular decline remains unexplained, 
despite controls for local workforce occupational structure and demographics. The recent evidence on wage 
growth among young black men (e.g., Chandra 2000; Juhn 2003) suggests that their estimated relative 
earnings growth in recent years has been inflated somewhat by declining labor force participation among 
the less-skilled. For earlier reviews of literature on this topic see Smith (2000) and Holzer (2000).  
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rates of those affected. But, until now, little good empirical evidence has been generated 
that links these developments to the general decline in employment activity for this 
population. 
In this paper we hope to provide such evidence. We begin below by documenting 
the continuing decline in employment and labor force participation among young black 
less-educated men, and why previous explanations in the literature for this development 
do not seem to work for the 1990s. We then discuss the likely negative effects of 
incarceration and child support policies on these employment outcomes.2 We review the 
previous literature on both issues, and discuss its strengths and limitations.  
We then describe the data we will use to address these issues. We have merged 
state-level data over the past two decades on black incarceration rates as well as 
enforcement of child support policies into data from the Outgoing Rotation Groups of the 
Current Population Survey (CPS-ORG). After providing some summary results on 
employment rates during this period as well as incarceration and child support policies, 
we present the results of our estimated regressions linking the latter to the former. In 
particular, we use a three-year lag on black male incarceration rates as a proxy for the 
presence of ex-offenders in the black male population of each state, as well as 
contemporaneous child support data. We provide estimates of these equations estimated 
by ordinary least squares (OLS) and also by difference-in-difference (DD) methods, 
where the latter are based on differences between estimated effects for young less-
educated black men and white men. We provide some additional evidence from a series 
                                                          
2 Since those who are incarcerated do not appear in the usual calculations of employment rates for the 
civilian noninstitutionalized population, and since the decision to participate in crime is, in any event, 
jointly determined with employment outcomes and not necessarily causally related, we focus instead on 
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of Hausman tests to confirm that the variation in lagged incarceration and child support 
policies are indeed exogenous; and we provide additional evidence that the child support 
policy index that we use affects child support outcomes at the state level. Finally, we 
conclude with some discussion of the implications of these findings for public policy.  
II. Recent Trends in Male Employment 
We begin by documenting the continuing decline in employment and labor force 
participation among young less-educated black men. In Figures 1 through 4, we plot 
employment and labor force participation rates of young and less-educated black, white 
and Hispanic men for the period 1979–2000. Figures 1 and 2 present employment-to-
population ratios and labor force participation rates for those age 16–24; while figures 3 
and 4 present comparable plots for those age 25–34. In both cases, the sample consists of 
those with high school or less education who are not currently enrolled in school.3 The 
period in question includes two recessions (1981–82 and 1990–92) as well as three 
cyclical peaks in 1979, 1989, and 1999–2000. 
The results show that employment and labor force participation rates among 
young white and Hispanic less-educated men are fairly comparable to one another, but 
these rates among comparable young black men have lagged behind those of the other 
two groups over the entire period. Employment rates for all three groups show some 
cyclical movements, with declines in the early 1980s and 1990s for each; cyclical 
movements in labor force participation are less pronounced. But the gaps in employment 
and especially labor force activity between young black men and the other groups widen 
                                                                                                                                                                             
post-incarceration effects among those who are released from prison (i.e., those usually known as “ex-
offenders”). 
3 The question of whether school enrollment decisions should be treated as exogenous here, and the 
implications of doing so, are addressed below. 
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over time. During the 1990s, employment rates among white and Hispanic young men 
stabilize, after declining somewhat in the 1980s; these declines have been analyzed 
elsewhere, and have been attributed to declining real wages experienced by these groups.4 
But the declines experienced by young blacks are greater during that decade than for the 
other groups of men, and they continue during the 1990s. If anything, the decline in labor 
force activity for black 16- to 24-year-olds is greater in the 1990s than the 1980s, despite 
the stronger economy of the latter period and the higher educational attainments of young 
blacks. Among 25-to 34-year-olds, the decline in the 1990s in labor force activity is much 
less pronounced, but still noticeable.  
And, since these calculations are based only on those currently in the civilian 
noninstitutional population, they ignore the large numbers of young black men currently 
incarcerated. Indeed, incarceration rates among young black men are now roughly 12 
percent for the age groups considered here (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2003); this, along 
with the well-known undercount of young black men relative to other groups, implies that 
the observed employment rates of young black men may be overstated by as much as 20 
percent.  
We also note that the decline in employment of young black men in the 1990s is 
not well accounted for by factors that have been emphasized in the literature of earlier 
decades. This literature has emphasized a variety of factors, such as disappearing 
industrial jobs, falling real wages, skill gaps between whites and blacks, competition 
from women and immigrants, and alternative income through crime, in accounting for 
                                                          
4 See Juhn (1992) and Devereux (2003) on this issue. Whether real wages really declined over this period 
or simply stagnated depends on one’s judgment of the extent to which the Consumer Price Index and other 
indices overstate inflation (see Schultz 2003); but the decline in their wages relative to those of more-
educated men and women more broadly is not in dispute.  
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differences in employment (as well as wages) between black and white men.5 But gaps in 
skills, as measured by test scores, were lower for the cohort entering the labor market in 
the 1990s than for earlier ones. Real wages, after being stagnant or falling for roughly 
two decades, began climbing once again for all workers, especially the less-skilled, in the 
late 1990s; and crime rates fell strongly during the decade.6 Though blue-collar and 
manufacturing jobs continued to decline as a share of the economy, these factors seem to 
account for relatively little of the declining employment of young black men. Recent 
evidence also casts doubt on the importance of substitution by women or immigrants as a 
major factor. And, of course, the strength of the labor market should have 
disproportionately raised employment among young black men, relative to most other 
groups, given their greater sensitivity to cyclical swings in the economy.7  
III. Incarceration and Child Support: Potential Effects and Empirical Evidence 
Both incarceration rates and child support enforcement grew dramatically in the 1980s 
and especially the 1990s. Both forces were disproportionately concentrated on the 
community of young black men. For instance, 5 percent of all black men were 
incarcerated as of 2002, relative to just 2 percent of Hispanic men and less than 1 percent 
of white men. Among young black men, the incarceration rate was 12 percent. These 
rates, of course, reflect incarceration at any point in time. Among those who are not 
currently incarcerated, Freeman estimates that 22 percent of all black men have been 
previously incarcerated—which suggests that, among the younger cohorts, the rates 
                                                          
5 See Holzer op. cit. for a review of evidence on these matters. 
6 See Juhn (2003) for recent evidence on trends in real wages, Hauser and Huang (1996) for evidence on 
trends in test scores, and Freeman (1999) for evidence on falling crime rates. 
7 Most studies (e.g., Hamermesh and Bean 1998) find little evidence of strong substitution between 
immigrants and blacks in the labor market. While Borjas (1986) found evidence of substitution between 
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might reach 30 percent or more.8 Furthermore, one-quarter of less-educated black women 
age 16–24 and one-half of those age 25–34 are custodial mothers of children with a father 
living elsewhere; these rates are much higher than for any other demographic group and 
suggest that a high percentage of young black men are noncustodial fathers.9  
Why would incarceration and child support have negative effects on the 
employment and labor force activity of young black men? As noted earlier, incarceration 
itself draws young men out of the noninstitutional population, and thus does not directly 
affect measured employment; if anything, it might actually raise the measured 
employment rate by eliminating from the sample those young men whose employment 
prospects were the weakest.10 In contrast, the effects of previous incarceration on the 
employment prospects of ex-offenders is likely more negative. For one thing, the skills 
and personal characteristics of these men are very poor. While some factors—such as 
high school completion and cognitive skills—likely reflect pre-incarceration 
characteristics, others—such as poor work experience, habits, and employment 
networks—more likely reflect the effects of incarceration per se. The high rates of 
substance abuse among this population might also be partly reinforced by the 
incarceration spell.  
Furthermore, employers are much less likely to hire ex-offenders than other 
groups of comparably skilled workers. Using data from employer surveys, Holzer et al. 
(2002, 2003) have documented that employers are much more averse to hiring 
                                                                                                                                                                             
adult women and younger black men. Blank and Gelbach (2002) found little evidence of strong effects 
more recently.  
8 See Freeman (2003) for these calculations. Since incarceration rates have risen steeply in recent years, and 
such incarceration is mostly concentrated among younger black men, we infer that the fraction of men 
under 40 with criminal records significantly exceeds the average for all age groups in that population.  
9 See the Bureau of Justice Statistics (2003). Child support tabulations are from the 2000 Current 
Population Survey-Child Support Supplement. 
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individuals with criminal records than any other group of disadvantaged workers. There 
are a variety of reasons for this—such as prohibition by law (federal or state) in particular 
occupations; employer fears about potential legal liability if an offender does harm to a 
customer or coworker; employer fears about their own property and physical safety; etc.11
Further, employers seem more averse to hiring black men with criminal records 
than comparable white men. Pager (forthcoming) conducted an audit study of employers 
in the Milwaukee area, in which matched pairs of black and white applicants with and 
without criminal records applied for jobs. She found that offenders got significantly 
fewer offers than non-offenders in either racial group, but that black ex-offenders found it 
especially difficult to get jobs.12 And the aversion to hiring ex-offenders might even limit 
job options for young black men who do not have criminal records. Holzer et al. (2002) 
have found that employers who do not actually check criminal records hire fewer black 
men than those who do—consistent with the idea that those employers are discriminating 
statistically against young black men in the absence of explicit information on exactly 
who has or has not been an offender.  
Previous empirical evidence largely bears out the notion that ex-offender status 
limits employment opportunities for young men. Some studies find strong negative 
effects on their employment rates (e.g., Freeman 1992) while others find them instead on 
earnings (Grogger 1995; Kling et al. 2001). But, assuming that the labor supply of these 
                                                                                                                                                                             
10 See Katz and Krueger (1999).  
11 The occupations most likely to exclude those with criminal records include those involving any kind of 
child, elder or patient care; as well as those involving the handling of finances or interstate movement of 
goods. For a review of court cases and legal issues surrounding employer liability for damages caused by 
an employee who is an ex-offender see Holzer et al. (2003). 
12 In her study, 34 percent and 14 percent of white and black men respectively who had not been offenders 
received job offers in the time period under study, while the comparable rates for offenders were 17 percent 
and 5 percent. The sample was not large enough to show a significant interaction effect between race and 
ex-offender status, though the magnitudes of the findings suggest such an interaction. 
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young men is quite sensitive to expected wage rates (Holzer 1986; Grogger 1997), then it 
is likely that anything that depresses their earnings should ultimately also lower their 
rates of employment and labor force participation. Furthermore, while much of this 
literature assumes that the biases in these estimates are likely to be toward finding 
negative effects of past incarceration on employment outcomes (because of unobserved 
personal characteristics that will be negatively correlated with incarceration but positively 
with employment), other biases (e.g., from measurement error in self-reported rates of 
criminal activity) might go in the opposite direction.13  
With regard to child support, the growing establishment and enforcement of child 
support orders tends to raise the expected value of the order against noncustodial parents, 
by raising the probability that any such order will have to be paid if one has regular 
earnings. Furthermore, these orders constitute a large tax on the earnings of low-income 
noncustodial fathers. Child support orders for low-income noncustodial fathers are in the 
range of 20–35 percent of income (Pirog et al. 1998). When combined with payroll taxes 
and phase-out ranges for food stamp benefits, the marginal tax rates on these men are 
often as high as 60–80 percent (Primus 2002). If noncustodial fathers are behind in their 
child support, states will garnish up to 65 percent of their take-home pay to cover their 
child support payments, which is the federal limit on wage garnishment for debt purposes 
(Mincy and Sorensen 1998; Sorensen and Oliver 2002).14
                                                          
13 See Holzer et al. (2002) for extensive discussion of these biases. For discussions of self-report bias of 
criminal activity and how it varies by race see Viscusi (1986) and Hindelang et al. (1981). To the extent 
that employers fail to hire non-offenders because they cannot distinguish them from offenders, a bias 
toward zero in estimated negative effects will be reinforced. 
14 If child support orders are not readjusted for many low-income fathers when their earnings rise, the 
statutory marginal rate may not be the effective one. The most important effective rates may be the ones 
between zero and any positive earnings that trigger the payment of orders at average rates of about 25 
percent for those paying on time and 65 percent for those in arrears.  
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Of course, the extent to which high marginal tax rates discourage labor supply 
depends on the elasticity of labor supply for any given group. While most studies have 
found labor supply elasticities of prime-age middle-class men that are close to zero (e.g., 
Ehrenberg and Smith 2000), they seem to be larger for low-wage workers and especially 
for low-wage young black men, whose participation in the labor market might be quite 
sensitive to perceived risks and returns in the legal and illegal (or “underground”) 
economies.15 As an example, if a quarter to a half of all young black men are 
noncustodial parents who face marginal tax rates of about .30 because of child support 
orders; and if labor supply elasticities are in the range of 0.4-1.0; then labor supply of the 
overall group might be reduced by anywhere from 3 to 15 percent as a result. If 
substantial fractions of the noncustodial fathers are in arrears, the negative effects would 
be even larger.16
But, to date, the empirical evidence on these issues has been fairly weak. While 
there is fairly strong evidence that more stringent enforcement of child support policy 
raises child support payments to families and reduces participation on welfare (e.g., 
Garfinkle et al. 1998; Freeman and Waldfogel 2001; Huang et al. 2002; Sorensen and 
Hill forthcoming), we have had less clear evidence on its effects on the labor supply of 
low-income men. In particular, Freeman and Waldfogel (2000) find little evidence of 
labor supply effects, though their study suffers from a number of data limitations.17  
                                                          
15 See Juhn et al. (1991) for evidence of larger labor supply elasticities among low-wage workers in 
general, and Grogger (1997) for strong evidence on young men choosing between legal and illegal work. 
16 This discussion assumes that the noncustodial parents can escape undetected into the underground 
economy, and that their incentives to pay child support for their children are limited either because of their 
weak ties to their children or because their children are on public assistance and thus they receive little, if 
any, of the child support paid on their behalf.  
17 They use data only from the 1986 and 1991 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). 
Separate estimates for white and black men are not provided, and the measures of state-level enforcement 
activity that they use capture only a few of the policies in our index. 
 10
IV. Data and Estimation Issues 
For our estimates below we have used data from the Current Population Survey Outgoing 
Rotation Groups (CPS-ORG) for the period 1979–2000. We limit our sample to young 
less-educated men—i.e., those age 16–34 who have a high school diploma or less—in the 
civilian noninstitutional population. We also focus on those who are not currently 
enrolled in school. While excluding the enrolled in a period of rising school enrollments 
could cause biases in our estimated employment trends over time, we have found in 
earlier work that these effects are small empirically.18  
As in figures 1–4, the primary outcome variables in which we are interested are 
whether each young man is employed and whether he participates in the labor force.19 In 
these data, we can control for certain personal characteristics of the young men 
themselves, such as their age and educational attainment (where the latter is limited to 
whether they have a higher school degree); as well as a number of characteristics of the 
local labor markets in which these young men reside—such as the unemployment rate, 
occupational composition, and demographics of the workforce—at the metropolitan 
level.20
We have also appended state-level data on incarceration of black men and child 
support policies in each year to these data. The incarceration rates we use are the 
percentages of the black male population in each state and year that are incarcerated, 
                                                          
18 In a period of rising enrollments, their exclusion from the sample might lower the average quality of 
those who remain nonenrolled over time. But in Holzer and Offner (2002), controlling for enrollment rates 
of young blacks at the metropolitan level had very little effect on estimated trends in employment among 
the nonenrolled over time.  
19 Following Clark and Summers (1982), we ignore the distinction between those unemployed versus out of 
the labor force here. 
20 The unemployment rates used here are published estimates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, while the 
other metropolitan-area variables are calculated from the CPS data on our own. For more information on 
these see Holzer and Offner, op. cit. 
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lagged by three years.21 Since the average length of a prison stay for an offender before 
release is about 3 years (Travis et al. 2001), the lagged rate should capture the flow of 
black ex-offenders in the state’s population in any given year.  
Of course, for our purposes we would prefer to have a measure of the stock of all 
ex-offenders in every state and in each year, rather than its annual flow. However, to our 
knowledge no such measure exists.22 Summing the annual flow across different years 
would be inappropriate, given the high rates of recidivism in the population of ex-
offenders over time and that the absence of such data before the 1980s would severely 
truncate our analysis. On the other hand, an annual flow in a measure that is highly 
autocorrelated (as this one is) and which closely fits the relevant age group should serve 
as a reasonable proxy for the stock measure.23 Still, it is important to remember (as we 
noted above) that the magnitudes of both incarceration and ex-offenders in the population 
will be much higher for younger cohorts of black men than for all cohorts combined.  
To measure child support policy at the state level, our primary variable of interest 
is an index of state activities in any state designed to establish paternity and extract child 
support payments from noncustodial parents. Our index is simply the sum of six 0–1 
measures on whether a state undertakes each of a set of activities that includes (1) 
universal wage withholding for noncustodial fathers; (2) the establishment of 
presumptive guidelines for support orders; (3) interception of state income tax refunds 
                                                          
21Data from BJS on incarceration rates by race are available starting in 1981; thus three-year lagged data 
are available only from 1984 onwards. 
22 Christopher Uggen of the University of Minnesota has generated some estimates of ex-offenders at the 
state level, though not for different years. His measures also include those on felony probation, many of 
whom have not been incarcerated. See Uggen and Manza (2002).   
23 For example, the correlation between contemporaneous incarceration rates of young black men and the 
three-year lagged value of this variable is about .80. Since the average age of prisoners at the time of 
release is roughly 30, a measure that captures annual releases will accurately reflect the flow into our 
sample of young males age 16–34.   
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from those who are delinquent in payment; (4) having an in-hospital paternity 
establishment program; (5) presumptive use of genetic testing to establish paternity; and 
(6) use of the “New Hire Directory” recently established by the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services to identify noncustodial parents at their places of work. 
Similar indices have been used in the empirical literature on child support cited above, 
though our index has been modified in a number of ways from those previous efforts.24
Figures 5 and 6 plot the mean values of black incarceration rates and child support 
enforcement indices respectively at the state level over time. Figure 5 clearly shows a 
steep upward trend in incarceration rates of black men, with a noticeable upward shift in 
the trend in the late 1980s. Figure 6 also demonstrates the rising enforcement of child 
support orders over time, with some acceleration in the upward trend occurring in the 
second half of the 1980s and especially in the 1990s.  
Using these data, our estimated equations are as follows: 
1) EMPijkt= f(Xijkt; Xjt; INCARCk,t-3; CSkt; TIMEt; STATEk) + uijkt 
2) LFijkt= g(Xijkt; Xjt; INCARCk,t-3; CSkt; TIMEt; STATEk) + vijkt 
where EMP and LF denote whether the individual in question is employed or in 
the labor force respectively; the X refer to various personal or metropolitan-level 
characteristics; INCARC and CS refer to incarceration rates and the various child support 
policy variables respectively; TIME represents a set of year dummies and STATE 
represents a set of state dummies; and i, j, k, and t denote the person, metro area, state 
                                                          
24 The timing of the policy measures is based on whether the activity in question was in effect as of July 1 
of each year. Our index is based on more variables than that used by Freeman and Waldfogel, while it 
contains fewer than that used by Huang et al. The latter contains three variables for withholding wages and 
two for guidelines (advisory versus presumptive) while we use only the strictest and broadest of these in 
each case; they also use the right to establish paternity until age 18 (which we consider ineffectual) while 
we add in-hospital paternity establishment and the use of the “New Hire” directory, both of which were 
generally enacted by the states in the mid- to late 1990s. 
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and year respectively. All versions of equations 1 and 2 are estimated as linear 
probability models (which differ very little from some logit models that we have 
estimated), and reported standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level 
(using Huber-White methods).  
Before moving onto the estimated results of these equations, we briefly address a 
few econometric issues. For one thing, the exogeneity of the incarceration variables 
might be questionable here, since incarceration (and crime) might be functions of 
employment rates as well as vice versa. However, our primary focus is on a three-year 
lagged incarceration rate. While this variable is unlikely to be strictly endogenous with 
respect to contemporaneous employment rates, it might still be correlated with the error 
term if states with severe employment problems for young black men generate high rates 
of incarceration over time.  
However, we report results from Hausman tests below that generally indicate that 
the lagged incarceration rate appears exogenous in these equations. We use two sets of 
potential instrumental variables (IVs) to generate these tests: a set of variables measuring 
state-level limits on incarceration generated by overcrowding legislation, as used by 
Levitt (1996); and another set of variables measuring sentencing reforms at the state level 
(Reitz 2004).25 We discuss these variables in greater detail below, and argue that they are 
appropriate as potential IVs. Further, our inclusion of state and time dummies in all 
estimated equations, as well as time-varying measures of relevant labor market 
characteristics at the metropolitan level, further strengthens our confidence that we have 
controlled for many of the local factors that could lead our lagged incarceration measures 
to be correlated with the error term. 
 14
Another concern might involve unobserved heterogeneity across states. While the 
state dummies will control for state characteristics that are fixed over time, we might also 
be concerned about time-varying characteristics that might be correlated with child 
support policy and/or incarceration at the state level. To deal with this problem, we 
present some “difference-in-difference” (or DD) estimates below, in which we pool our 
sample of young black men with comparable samples of young whites, and estimate the 
effect of lagged incarceration and child support policy on the employment rates of blacks 
relative to those of these other groups. In doing so, we attribute all observed effects of 
these variables on whites to unobserved heterogeneity, and infer the effects on blacks 
only from any additional effects that these variables have on that group.26 This likely 
leads to the understatement of effects for blacks, particularly on child support, since our 
estimates of the fractions of whites who are noncustodial fathers (especially in the 25–34 
age group) are not trivial; these estimates thus generate lower bounds to the true effects.27
Finally, to ensure that our child support measures are really capturing the effects 
of policy on the expected values of child support payment, we provide some additional 
estimates of their effects on other measures of child support outcomes, such as numbers 
of cases with collections (relative to the number of single mothers in any state) and total 
collections per state within the public child support collections system. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
25 We thank Steve Levitt and Kevin Reitz for sharing their data with us.  
26 In most cases, DD estimates are based on interactions between the variables of interest and dummy 
variables for being black, with the estimated effects coming only from the interaction terms. In our case, we 
have estimated effects on separate samples of young white and black men and used the differences in 
coefficients between them to infer the DD effect, since our Chow tests strongly rejected the pooling of 
these samples.  
27 Calculations from the CPS Child Support Supplement indicate that the percentages of young white 
women with high school or less education who are single mothers are 9 percent and 24 percent among 
those age 16–24 and 25–34 respectively. 
 15
V. Estimation Results: Summary Statistics and Regressions  
Table 1 presents means and standard deviations on the key dependent and independent 
variables we use in our analysis. These include the employment/population and labor 
force participation rates of less-educated young black men, broken down separately by 
age group (16–24 versus 25–34); as well as personal variables (age and high school 
graduation rates), metropolitan area variables (local unemployment rate and percent of 
the labor force accounted for by blue-collar occupations and by Hispanics or females), 
and key state-level variables reflecting trends in incarceration and child support policy. 
We present these data pooled over all years (1979–2000) as well as for three specific 
periods that mark business cycle peaks (1979, 1989, and 1999–2000).28
The data confirm many of the trends over time that appeared in figures 1–6. 
Employment and labor force participation rates of young black men declined during both 
the 1980s and 1990s, especially among those age 16–24. The declines for the youngest 
group accelerated in the 1990s, while they are more mixed for the older group (with 
employment rates flattening but participation rates declining at roughly the same rate as 
in the earlier decade). The metropolitan-level variables reflect the gradually improving 
unemployment rates over the two decades, but the continued decline of blue-collar jobs 
as a share of the labor market and the growth of women and especially Hispanics in the 
labor force. 
The state-level variables also show that incarcerated rates grew quite dramatically 
among black men over the two decades, as did child support enforcement efforts. Indeed, 
by the end of the 1990s the six activities included in our state index were being 
                                                          
28 Unfortunately, data on incarceration for black males were available only beginning in 1981, and thus 
lagged rates only begin in 1984. 
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implemented by virtually all states, which constituted a sharp increase in activity even 
from 1989. 
To what extent did these higher incarceration rates and growing enforcement of 
child support orders influence the employment and labor force activities of young black 
men? Table 2 provides OLS regression estimates of equation 1 above for employment 
and of equation 2 for labor force participation. Table 3 presents the DD estimates for the 
same equations, based on differences between estimates for young black and white men. 
All reported estimates are derived from linear probability models. Separate estimates 
appear for those age 16–24 and 25–34 in each table. Robust (i.e., Huber-White) standard 
errors appear in parentheses. 
Results from three specifications of each estimated equation are presented. The 
first includes our lagged incarceration measure but not the child support index; the 
second includes the child support index but not lagged incarceration; and the third 
includes both. We present results from all three specifications because of the high 
correlation of these two measures with state and time dummies and with each other.29  As 
noted above, all specifications include state and time dummies, as well as controls for 
time-varying demographic and labor market characteristics of metropolitan areas.  
The results of tables 2 and 3 generally provide support for the hypothesis that 
previous incarceration limits the employment and labor force activity of young black 
men. Results are generally stronger for labor force participation than for employment, 
perhaps since the former is a cleaner measure of labor supply than the latter; results are 
                                                          
29 State and time dummies account for 80–90 percent of the variation in each of these variables. 
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also generally stronger for those age 25–34, among whom the concentrations of ex-
offenders are noncustodial fathers are generally larger.  
The estimated effects of lagged incarceration on employment are generally 
negative but not significant among those age 16–24, while those on labor force 
participation are mostly significant. Among those age 25–34, estimated effects on both 
measures are generally significant. The inclusion of controls for child support policy in 
these equations has little effect on these estimates, and DD estimates are similar to or a 
bit larger than OLS estimates. The estimated magnitudes of these coefficients are 
generally in the range of .6 to 1.5. Since each percentage point of lagged incarceration in 
our independent variable corresponds to as much as 6 percentage points of ex-offenders 
in the population of young black men (since incarceration rates for the overall black male 
population now average about .05 and the percentages of ex-offenders in the young black 
male population are roughly .30), these magnitudes imply that each additional percentage 
point of ex-offenders in the population reduces employment and labor force participation 
by about .10–.25 percentage points, which seems plausible and consistent with earlier 
research (by Freeman and others) that we note above. 
The estimated effects of child support policy on employment and labor force 
participation of young black men are more sensitive to specification changes and 
estimation methods. All coefficients are negative and significant when we do not also 
control for previous incarceration rates; the estimated magnitudes of effects on labor 
force activity decline somewhat when we move from OLS to DD estimates, though (as 
we noted earlier) the latter might be lower bounds to the true effects. 
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When we control for lagged incarceration, the estimated effects of child support 
weaken considerably. Given the correlations between the two measures, it is somewhat 
difficult to interpret this finding. Estimated effects for those age 16–24 generally 
disappear and even turn positive (though almost never significant, especially when 
estimated by DD). But effects among those age 25–34 remain negative, and labor force 
effects remain significant whether estimated by OLS or DD. These estimates were also 
quite sensitive to exactly how we specified controls for time, though they were negative 
and generally significant as well.30
As for the control variables in our equations, virtually all their estimated effects 
have the anticipated signs and many are significant. Higher age and high school diplomas 
among the youth tend to raise their employment and labor force activity, while higher 
unemployment rates in the metropolitan area tend to reduce them. The shares of local 
employment accounted for by blue-collar jobs and by Hispanics or women generally tend 
to reduce black male activity as well, though only the last of these three estimated effects 
is consistently significant.31  
How large are the estimated effects of lagged incarceration and child support 
policy on employment and labor force activity of young black men, and to what extent 
might they account for observed negative trends in the latter over time? In table 4 we 
present some calculations in which we multiply the coefficient estimates of tables 2 and 3 
by changes in lagged incarceration and child support enforcement activity over time from 
table 1. The results indicate that the roughly 3 percentage point increase in lagged 
                                                          
30 We estimated equations in which the time dummies were replaced with linear, quadratic or cubic time 
trends, as well as separate linear trends for the 1980s and 1990s. Results are available from the authors.  
31 These results are available from the authors. They do not differ greatly between the OLS and DD 
equations. Similar estimates also appear in Holzer and Offner (2002). In that paper we show that these 
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incarceration from the early 1980s through the year 2000 reduced employment of young 
black men by 2–4 percentage points and labor force participation by 3–5 points. 
Estimates of the effects of child support are more varied (especially in equations that 
controlled for incarceration), but for those age 25–34 the effects on labor force activity 
consistently imply declines of about 4 percentage points as well.  
Of course, the actual declines in such activity are larger for the younger cohort 
(.10 and .13 for employment and labor force participation, respectively) than for the older 
one (.07 and .09 respectively) during that time period. The results thus suggest that the 
effects of past incarceration and child support enforcement might account for most of the 
declines in labor force activity among the 25- to 34-year-old group, and a good deal less 
among the younger one. But since incarceration and noncustodial parenthood are so 
much higher among the former group, this is not surprising. If anything, some of their 
effects on the young might be indirect, perhaps by reducing their expectations of future 
labor market success. 
VI. Testing Our Policy Variables 
The estimates presented above suggest a link between previous incarceration and child 
support enforcement, on the one hand, and declining labor force activity among young 
black less-educated men, on the other. But some questions remain. For one thing, the 
extent to which lagged incarceration is exogenous with respect to employment outcomes 
might be subject to doubt. And whether child support policy is really driving these 
results, as opposed to some unobserved variables among blacks that are correlated with 
child support, might be questionable as well. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
variables account for fairly little of the trends over time in employment and labor force activity among 
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To address the issue of potential endogeneity in lagged incarceration, we present 
the results of some Hausman tests that we have performed. In these tests, we estimate the 
significance of differences between OLS and IV estimates. This can be done by including 
the residual from the first-stage IV estimates as an additional independent variable in the 
second-stage structural equation (Wooldridge 2002). Tests of statistical significance on 
these residuals are thus tests of whether we can reject the hypothesis that OLS and IV 
estimates are the same, which is equivalent to rejecting the hypothesis that our 
incarceration measure is exogenous. 
Of course, these tests depend importantly on the quality of potential IVs. As noted 
earlier, we use two sets of variables in our tests below: one generated by Levitt and 
representing state litigation on overcrowding that has limited incarceration in some states; 
and one generated by Reitz on state-level sentencing reforms. The former set of variables 
reflect six possible stages of potential litigation in states where such litigation has been 
introduced and where limits on incarceration were imposed: a period of pre-filing, filing, 
preliminary decisions by the courts, final decisions, further actions, and release from 
these restraints. In any given year, states where such litigation occurred might be in any 
one of these six stages, which are represented by a set of dummy variables. Levitt (1996) 
shows quite clearly that these variables are negatively related to incarceration rates, 
especially after filing has occurred and before release.  
The sentencing variables include dummies for the abolition of parole, 
presumptive or voluntary sentencing guidelines for felonies, no or limited appellate 
review of sentences, abolition of parole, and the existence of guidelines for intermediate 
                                                                                                                                                                             
young black men.  
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offenses. Reitz (2004) has also shown, perhaps surprisingly, that reductions in court 
discretion on sentencing tend to reduce incarceration rates among blacks. 
We provide some descriptive data on these IVs in table A.1 of the appendix. 
Twelve states had overcrowding litigation in the 1980s and 1990s, while fourteen states 
had implemented sentencing reforms by the end of our time period. The percentages of 
black men affected by these developments were about 12 percent at the peak of prison 
overcrowding litigation and roughly 15–30 percent by sentencing reforms at their peak. 
Our Hausman test statistics—i.e., the coefficients and standard errors on the 
residual in the second stage equations—appear in table 5. We present three sets of 
results—those using only the variables for overcrowding litigation as IVs, those using 
variables for sentencing reform only, and those using both. Results are presented 
separately for employment and labor force participation equations, and for those age 16–
24 and 25–34.  
We also present two specifications of each equation, both without and with the 
inclusion of the child support variable as an additional control. 
The results indicate that, in the vast majority of cases, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that lagged incarceration is exogenous with respect to employment outcomes. 
Indeed, for those age 25–34 this is true for every test. Among those age 16–24, results are 
a bit more mixed, but are similar to those for the 25- to 34-year-old cohort when both 
overcrowding litigation and sentencing reform variables are used as IVs.  
It is also noteworthy that the IVs performed reasonably well in the first stage 
equations we estimated. Specifically, both sets of variables were jointly significant at the 
.01 level in each case. The prison overcrowding litigation had uniformly negative effects 
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on incarceration among young black men, as Levitt had found for all demographic groups 
combined; the strongest negative effects were found for the periods in which preliminary 
or final decisions had been reached. The sentencing reform variables had more mixed 
effects, which varied according to whether or not the overcrowding litigation IVs were 
included in the equations.32
Thus, our IVs look like plausible instruments, and give us greater confidence in 
the Hausman test results. As we noted earlier, the fact that all of our estimated equations 
include state and time dummies as well as controls for a range of time-varying labor 
market characteristics also strengthen our confidence in these results.  
Finally, we explore the link between child support enforcement and other child 
support outcomes in table 6. We present estimates of equations in which two such 
outcomes—the fractions of single mothers receiving collections and the total real dollar 
values of such collections—are the dependent variables while our child support index is 
the independent variable, along with state and time dummies. The child support outcomes 
are drawn, in part, from federal data collected by the Office of Child Support 
Enforcement (OCSE) at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.33  
The estimated results indicate strongly positive and significant relationships 
between child support outcomes and our index of enforcement activities. Further, 
increases in our enforcement measure account for roughly 80 percent of the increases in 
                                                          
32 We found consistent positive effects of parole abolition and negative effects of guidelines for 
intermediate sanctions on black male incarceration rates, while the other coefficients varied with the 
specification. Our estimated equations included all of the sentencing reform variables in each specification, 
and so coefficients on individual variables might also be sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of some. 
33 The child support outcomes used in these equations are derived from data on OCSE’s IV-D program. Our 
dependent variables represent the numbers of IV-D cases in which collections occur and the total (deflated) 
dollar values of these collections divided by estimates of the numbers of single mothers in each state and 
year, as estimated from three-year moving averages in the CPS. Our estimated equations are also weighted 
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collections over time. Thus, our child support index seems to be capturing the relevant set 
of policy activities that are driving child support outcomes across states, and which 
apparently have implications for the labor force activity of young black men as well. 
VII. Conclusion  
In this paper we estimate the effects of previous incarceration and strict child support 
policy enforcement on the labor force behavior of young black men. We find that past 
incarceration is strongly and negatively associated with such behavior. We also find some 
evidence that child support enforcement limits labor force activity, especially among 
those age 25–34. In fact, our results imply that past incarceration and child support can 
account for most of the declines over time in labor force activity for this age group, 
though somewhat less among those age 16–24. Our OLS and DD results are generally 
similar, while our Hausman tests also suggest that our results are not driven by potential 
endogeneity in our lagged incarceration variable.  
As always, further research is needed to confirm these results and explore them in 
greater detail. For example, it would be nice to be able to supplement these state-level 
estimates with those based on micro-level data on young men and noncustodial fathers, 
so long as the biases discussed above can be dealt with. Better data on the levels of orders 
for low-income fathers would improve our ability to estimate effects for this important 
dimension of policy, as would good data on arrearages for low-income men.  
And evidence on cost-effective programmatic efforts to combat these problems is 
sorely needed as well. One such effort that has been rigorously evaluated is the Parents’ 
Fair Share program, which had little positive impact on employment outcomes of low-
                                                                                                                                                                             
by the numbers of young black men in each state, so states with very small black populations are not 
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income fathers. But critics have questioned whether the employment services provided to 
fathers in that effort were very strong, and whether the incentives (or coercion) inducing 
fathers to participate were very powerful. Perhaps other such efforts must provide 
subsidized employment opportunities as well as services/training, and need to involve 
strong incentives or requirements that young men participate (Primus 2002). Rigorous 
evaluations of programs aimed at ex-offenders—such as that provided by the Center for 
Employment Opportunities (CEO) in New York—are needed as well.34  
Beyond programmatic efforts, some broader policy changes might be needed to 
address the negative effects of incarceration and child support policy on employment of 
young black men. Regarding incarceration, policymakers at the state level should review 
the barriers to employment that they generate for ex-offenders, perhaps distinguishing 
those that are sensible from those that are strictly punitive and perhaps counterproductive 
(like drivers’ license revocation and other bans on occupational licensing for those with 
criminal records). Efforts to link ex-offenders to the private-sector labor market should 
begin while they remain incarcerated, by lessening restrictions on the ability of private 
employers to use inmate labor, especially in tight labor markets.35 And the use of other 
tools, such as federally sponsored bonding and tax credits to employers, should be 
explored further as well. 
Regarding child support, states should be encouraged and assisted in efforts to 
review the practices by which child support orders are developed for low-income men—
                                                                                                                                                                             
weighted equally with those having large populations.  
34 See Bushway (2003) for a review of evidence on the cost-effectiveness of employment programs aimed 
at ex-offenders. Programs generally provide support services, job placement assistance, training and (in the 
case of CEO) subsidized work experience.  
35 See Atkinson and Rostad (2003). One way of encouraging such employment without exploiting the 
prisoners themselves is to provide them with coverage by the Fair Labor Standards Act for minimum and 
overtime wages. 
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often without any direct evidence of their potential earnings. Arrearage forgiveness 
efforts need to be explored for noncustodial fathers who make a good-faith effort to keep 
up with current orders—especially if arrears have accumulated while they were 
incarcerated or otherwise unable to work.  
Of course, some of the employment declines we’ve observed here, especially 
among those age 16–24, do not appear attributable to incarceration or child support 
policy. As indicated elsewhere (Holzer and Offner 2004), a range of other policies would 
likely be needed as well to raise their employment rates. These might include efforts to 
improve education and training in this population as well as their incentives to accept 
low-wage jobs (for example, by expanding their eligibility for the EITC).  
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Figure 1: Employment/Population Rates for Males 16-24 years old, 1979-2000
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Figure 2: Employment/Population Rates for Males 25-34 years old, 1979-2000
60.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
100.0
1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000
Hispanic
White
Black
 
 
Figure 3: Labor Force Participation Rates for Males 16-24 years old, 1979-2000
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Figure 4: Labor Force Participation Rates for Males 25-34 years old, 1979-2000
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Figure 5: Trends over Time in Incarceration Rates of Black Men
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Figure 6: Trend over Time in Child Support Enforcement Policy
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This graph displays an index of the enactment of the following six child support enforcement policies: 
tiguidelines, state income tax refund interception, universal wage withholding, genetic testing results as a 
tidetermination of paternity, in-hospital voluntary paternity establishment, new hire directory.  Values range from 0 to 
6  
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Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev.
Outcomes for black 
Employment/Populatio
    16-24 years 0.525 0.499 0.615 0.487 0.586 0.493 0.513 0.500
    25-34 years 0.731 0.444 0.813 0.390 0.755 0.430 0.742 0.438
Participation in Labor 
    16-24 years 0.753 0.431 0.814 0.389 0.772 0.419 0.682 0.465
    25-34 years 0.861 0.346 0.907 0.291 0.868 0.339 0.821 0.383
Personal 
Age 25.229 5.273 24.271 5.230 25.641 5.205 25.558 5.387
Graduated from High 37.713 1.661 37.618 1.763 36.479 1.003 38.125 1.502
Metropolitan 
Unemployment 0.068 0.022 0.062 0.012 0.055 0.017 0.041 0.012
% of employment accounted 
    Blue collar 0.274 0.062 0.338 0.056 0.269 0.056 0.230 0.049
    Hispanics 0.072 0.092 0.055 0.600 0.064 0.092 0.123 0.125
    Females 0.449 0.022 0.419 0.015 0.453 0.018 0.468 0.019
State level 
Black male incarceration 
    Current 0.034 0.015 0.0201/ 0.007 1/ 0.035 0.011 0.055 0.014
    Three-year 0.033 0.014 0.0202/ 0.007 2/ 0.027 0.009 0.051 0.012
Child Support Policy 2.101 2.012 0.094 0.292 1.674 0.752 5.845 0.362
1/ These figures correspond to the year 
2/ These figures correspond to the year 
Note: The data are from the Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Groups (CPS-ORG), 1979-2000, 
metropolitan and state-level data. The samples of young black males include only those who are not enrolled
have high school or less 
The Child Support Policy Index ranges in value from 0 to 6 and is described in the text. Expenditures on child
enforcement are in thousands of 2000 dollars. All outcomes and personal variables are sample-weighted, wh
and state-level variables are also weighted by the numbers of black males in 
Table 1: Means and standard deviations - key variables (selected years)
1979-2000 1979 1989 1999-2000
 35 
A. Ages 16-24 1 2 3 1 2 3
1. Lagged incarceration rate -0.680 -0.580 -0.953 * -0.784
(0.797) (0.804) (0.706) (0.713)
2. Child Support Policy Index -0.781 *** 0.606 -0.927 *** 1.024 **
(0.264) (0.658) (0.227) (0.583)
R2 0.1514 0.1416 0.1515 0.1385 0.1364 0.1386
N 16,482 26,393 16,482 16,482 26,393 16,482
B. Ages 25-34
1. Lagged incarceration rate -0.758 -0.803 * -1.401 *** -1.512 ***
(0.610) (0.616) (0.490) (0.495)
2. Child Support Policy Index -1.029 *** -0.289 -1.394 *** -0.704 *
(0.224) (0.537) (0.174) (0.432)
R2 0.0790 0.0789 0.0790 0.0718 0.0706 0.0719
N 21,578 30,704 21,578 21,578 30,704 21,578
Table 2: Employment and Labor Force Participation Equations for Young Black Men: OLS
Employment Labor Force Participation
Other independent variables include the personal and metropolitan variables listed in Table 1, as well as state 
dummy variables. Huber-White standard errors appear in parentheses. Coefficients on child support variables 
are multiplied by 100. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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 A. Ages 16-24 1 2 3 1 2 3
1. Lagged incarceration rate -1.051 -0.959 -1.442 ** -0.981 *
(0.860) (0.867) (0.749) (0.745)
2. Child Support Policy Index -0.687 *** 0.089 -0.448 ** 0.450
(0.287) (0.715) (0.241) (0.609)
B. Ages 25-34
1. Lagged incarceration rate -0.949 * -1.290 ** -1.292 *** -1.403 ***
(0.647) (0.664) (0.513) (0.518)
2. Child Support Policy Index -1.062 *** -0.075 -0.937 *** -0.734 *
(0.238) (0.579) (0.182) (0.449)
Note: To obtain Difference-in-Difference results, we subtracted coefficients from equations for young white men 
from those for young black men. Standard errors are the squared roots of the sums of squared Huber-White 
standard errors for blacks and whites, and appear in parentheses.
Table 3: Employment and Labor Force Participation Equations for Young Black Men: 
Difference-in- Difference (DD)
Employment Labor Force Participation
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OLS
A. Ages 16-24 1 2 3 1 2 3
1. Lagged incarceration rate -0.021 -0.018 -0.030 -0.024
2. Child Support Policy Index -0.045 0.035 -0.053 0.059
B. Ages 25-34
1. Lagged incarceration rate -0.024 -0.025 -0.044 -0.047
2. Child Support Policy Index -0.059 -0.017 -0.080 -0.040
Difference-in-Difference 
A. Ages 16-24 1 2 3 1 2 3
1. Lagged incarceration rate -0.033 -0.030 -0.045 -0.031
2. Child Support Policy Index -0.039 0.005 -0.026 0.026
B. Ages 25-34
1. Lagged incarceration rate -0.030 -0.040 -0.040 -0.044
2. Child Support Policy Index -0.061 -0.004 -0.054 -0.042
Note: These estimates are derived by multiplying regression coefficients from Tables 2 and 3 by difference 
in means of lagged incarceration rates and child support indices between 1979 and 2000 from Table 1. 
Employment Labor Force Participation
Table 4: Implied Effects of Incarceration and Child Support Policies on Employment 
and Labor Force Participation of Young Black Males
Employment Labor Force Participation
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A. Ages 16-24 1 2 1 2
Instrumental Variables
1. Overcrowding litigation only -3.439 -3.945 * -3.829 * -4.543 **
(2.764) (2.883) (2.441) (2.540)
2. Sentencing reform only -8.527 *** -5.442 -1.741 4.228
(3.707) (7.677) (3.314) (6.583)
3. Both -0.881 -1.081 -1.644 -1.838
(2.392) (2.450) (2.139) (2.189)
B. Ages 25-34
Instrumental Variables
1. Overcrowding litigation only 0.469 -2.018 0.654 1.195
(2.301) (2.299) (1.902) (1.959)
2. Sentencing reform only -1.850 0.166 -0.575 3.669
(3.130) (5.891) (2.574) (4.859)
3. Both group of variables -0.671 -0.623 0.169 0.427
(1.849) (1.889) (1.371) (1.393)
Table 5: Hausman Test Statistics for Endogeneity of Lagged 
Incarceration Rate
Employment Labor Force Participation
The estimation of Hausman test statistics is described in the text. Huber-White standard 
errors are in parentheses. The estimates presented in column 1 are for equations that do not 
include the Child Support Index, while the ones in column 2 do include it.
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 Percent of cases 
with collections
Total value of 
collections
Mean 1979 0.110 3.796
Mean 2000 0.846 23.876
Coefficient from regressions on 
Child Support Policy Index 0.099 2.991
(Std.error) (0.0003) (0.0102)
R2 0.862 0.796
Actual change 1979-2000 0.737 20.080
Implied change 1979-2000 0.571 17.202
Table 6: Child Support Policy Index and Child Support 
Outcomes
Note: Equations are weighted by the numbers of black men aged 16-34 in 
each state. "Percentage of cases" is defined as the numbers of IVd cases with 
collections deflated by the number of single mothers in each state. "Total value 
of collections" is measured in thousands of dollars per single mother.
All equations include state and time dummies. 
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 All Years 1981 1989 1995
A. Prison Overcrowding Litigation
   Prefiling period 0.014 0.063 0.000 0.000
   Filing period 0.009 0.023 0.004 0.000
   Preliminary decision 0.033 0.058 0.037 0.000
   Final decision 0.062 0.058 0.117 0.076
   Further action 0.071 0.119 0.083 0.051
   Release 0.042 0.000 0.059 0.176
B. Sentencing Reforms
   Presumptive guidelines 0.102 0.001 0.063 0.155
   Voluntary guidelines 0.050 0.000 0.110 0.156
   Appellate review 0.103 0.000 0.143 0.272
   Intermediate sanction 0.060 0.000 0.051 0.150
   Abolished parole 0.093 0.001 0.079 0.206
Table A1. Instrumental Variables: Percentages of Black Men Affected By 
Year
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